The Euro and inflation uncertainty in the European Monetary Union by Kontonikas, A
 1 
THE EURO AND INFLATION UNCERTAINTY  
IN THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION 
 
 
Guglielmo Maria Caporale
*      
Brunel University, London 
 
Alexandros Kontonikas    University of Glasgow 
 
 
 
October 2007 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper adopts a time-varying GARCH framework to obtain estimates of short-run and steady-state 
inflation uncertainty in twelve EMU countries, and then investigate their relationship with inflation. 
The effects of the introduction of the Euro in 1999 are examined introducing a dummy variable into 
the model. Tests for endogenously determined breaks are also carried out. Overall, we find a 
considerable degree of heterogeneity across EMU countries in terms of average inflation, its degree of 
persistence, and both steady-state and short-run uncertainty, whilst the trend component of inflation is 
generally decreasing. Breaks in the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty are found 
to occur at various dates, frequently well before the introduction of the Euro. Both heterogeneity and 
the fact that the Friedman-Ball link between inflation and inflation uncertainty appears to have 
become much weaker in the new monetary environment make the task of the ECB a very challenging 
one. 
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1. Introduction 
The introduction of the euro and of a common monetary policy in 1999 
undoubtedly represented a major policy regime shift for the member countries of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). This could have affected both inflation 
expectations and inflation uncertainty, as, at least initially, agents might not have 
been certain of the objective function and the policy preferences of the European 
Central Bank (ECB), and of how they might compare to those of the national central 
banks previously in charge of monetary policy (for instance, the ECB might have 
been perceived as less credible than the Bundesbank, which had an established anti-
inflation reputation). Uncertainty about the policy preferences of the new monetary 
authorities might also result in higher inflation forecast errors. According to the 
Maastricht Treaty, although the primary objective of the ECB is price stability 
(which the ECB has interpreted as an annual Euro area inflation rate below, but close 
to, 2% in the medium run), it should also be concerned about output and employment 
(albeit without prejudicing its main objective). The monetary policy framework 
adopted by the ECB to fulfil these tasks is based on two analytical perspectives or 
two “pillars”, namely economic analysis and monetary analysis1, and the ECB has 
repeatedly stated that achieving price stability is the most effective way to contribute 
to output and employment growth (see, e.g. Monetary Policy Strategy, 1999), but 
nevertheless higher uncertainty might have characterised the new economic 
environment. 
Analysing survey data, Heinemann and Ullrich (2004) do not find significant 
differences in the inflationary credibility of the ECB compared to the Bundesbank, 
and hence no permanent change in inflation expectations. However, their analysis 
suggests that the higher uncertainty characterising the period leading up to EMU led 
to a temporary change in expectation formation, with agents relying more heavily on 
backward-looking expectations, before reverting to the normal mechanisms once the 
ECB had established its inflation credibility. 
                                                          
1
 Economic analysis aims at assessing the short- to medium-term determinants of price developments 
focusing on real activity and financial conditions in the economy. Monetary analysis focuses on a 
longer-term horizon taking into account the long-run relationship between money and prices. A 
reference value of 4.5% for the growth rate of broad money (M3) that is compatible with price 
stability has been calculated using the quantity theory equation. The ECB has stated, though, that 
“monetary policy does not react mechanically to deviations of M3 growth from the reference value” 
(see The Monetary Policy of the ECB, 2004). As Rudebusch and Svensson (1999, p.1) point out, the 
ECB strategy “appears to be a combination of a weak type of monetary targeting and an implicit form 
of inflation targeting”.  
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As for inflation uncertainty, in a recent review of the performance of the ECB 
in the first few years of the new regime, its President, Jean-Claude Trichet, has 
expressed the view that “… the ECB has, despite substantial adverse price shocks, 
successfully kept inflation and inflation expectations at low levels by historical 
standards. The single monetary policy and its clear focus on the maintenance of price 
stability have helped to anchor inflation expectations in the euro area over the 
medium and the long term. This has facilitated a reduction of inflation uncertainty 
and the associated risk premia” (see Trichet, 2004). 
In this paper, we adopt an appropriate econometric framework to analyse 
empirically whether the new policy regime with the ECB setting a common interest 
rate for the EMU countries has in fact different features, in particular whether the 
link between inflation and inflation uncertainty has changed. Specifically, we use a 
time-varying model with a GARCH specification for the conditional volatility of 
inflation, as in Evans (1991), and obtain estimates for twelve EMU countries, over 
the period 1973-2004, using monthly data. The adopted framework enables us to 
distinguish between different types of inflation uncertainty which can affect the 
inflation process. Next, we estimate the relationship between inflation and inflation 
uncertainty taking into account the possibility of breaks. Dummy variables 
corresponding to the introduction of the Euro are initially incorporated into the 
model. However, as the mere announcement of a regime switching from floating to 
fixed rates at a given future date can determine changes in the behaviour of rational 
agents prior to the fixing, we also determine endogenously the break dates using a 
procedure developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). This allows us to investigate 
whether adjustment took place much before the introduction of the Euro. This type of 
analysis is motivated by some theoretical literature demonstrating that rational agents 
will react to the announcement of a regime switch from floating to fixed rates well 
before the change occurs (see Wilfling, 2004, and Wilfling and Maennig, 2001).  
Our empirical findings enable us to shed light on the difficulties encountered 
by the ECB in fulfilling its mission in the new environment resulting from the 
introduction of the Euro. In particular, we find that in the post-Euro period there are 
still significant inflation differentials across countries, implying different real interest 
rates for the various EMU members given a single nominal interest rate. Further, 
heterogeneity in both short-run and steady state-uncertainty occurs even in the 
presence of a common currency: although the former is only to be expected given the 
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well-known lags of monetary policy, the latter clearly makes the ECB’s policy 
objective of long-run price stability hard to achieve. Moreover, the relationship 
between inflation and inflation uncertainty appears to have broken down in a number 
of cases, implying that the ECB faces an even harder task in keeping inflation under 
control. Under the circumstances, the ECB can be deemed to have performed at least 
satisfactorily, but it is possible that some suggested changes to its analytical 
framework might make its policies even more effective. 
The layout of the paper is the following. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 outlines the empirical framework. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 5 summarises the main findings and discusses their policy 
implications. 
 
2. A Brief Literature Review 
The relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty has received 
increased attention in recent years. Friedman (1977) first argued that higher average 
inflation would result in more inflation uncertainty. This idea was developed by Ball 
(1992). In his model, in the presence of two types of policymakers with different 
preferences, who stochastically alternate in power, higher inflation generates higher 
inflation uncertainty, as agents do not know when monetary authorities with a 
tougher stance on inflation will replace the current ones. In contrast to the Friedman-
Ball hypothesis, the effect of inflation of its uncertainty can also be negative.  As  
Pourgerami and Maskus (1987) point out in an environment of accelerating inflation 
agents may invest more resources in forecasting inflation, thus reducing uncertainty 
about inflation (see also Ungar and Zilberfarb, 1993). Causality in the opposite 
direction, namely from inflation uncertainty to inflation, is instead a property of 
models based on the Barro-Gordon set up, such as the one due to Cukierman and 
Meltzer (1986), in which there is an incentive for policymakers to create inflation 
surprises to raise output growth.  
A number of empirical studies have investigated the relationship between 
inflation and inflation uncertainty, typically adopting an econometric framework of 
the GARCH type to measure uncertainty (see Engle, 1982), and providing mixed 
evidence (see Davis and Kanago, 2000 for a survey). Most studies, such as Grier and 
Perry (1998), adopt a two-step procedure: they estimate GARCH models to generate 
a measure of inflation uncertainty, and then carry out Granger causality tests (see 
 5 
also Fountas et al, 2004)
 2
. Using data for the G7 countries, they find strong evidence 
of causality running from inflation uncertainty to inflation, but less empirical support 
for causality in the opposite direction (see also Baillie et al, 1996). Various studies 
focus on the US, again with mixed results. Brunner and Hess (1993), and Grier and 
Perry (1998, 2000), inter alia, find evidence of a Friedman effect, with Baillie et al 
(1996) reporting the opposite. More recently, the impact of inflation targeting on this 
relationship has been analysed. Kontonikas (2004) reports that the adoption of an 
explicit target in the UK has resulted in lower inflation persistence and long-run 
uncertainty.  
Fountas et al (2004) argue that in the context of EMU the linkages between 
inflation, inflation uncertainty and output growth have even more important 
implications for monetary policy, since price stability becomes an even more crucial 
policy objective for the ECB if inflation is found to affect inflation uncertainty. 
Further, asymmetries in the effects of inflation uncertainty on output across member 
countries could make a common monetary policy a less effective stabilisation tool. In 
fact their empirical analysis, based on EGARCH models, provides evidence 
supporting the Friedman hypothesis and the presence of asymmetric real effects. 
However, their sample period is 1960-1999, and hence does not include the new 
monetary policy setting resulting from the introduction of the euro, whose effects on 
inflation we wish to examine. Further, their analysis does not distinguish between 
different types of inflation uncertainty, whilst the approach taken in the present 
study, as explained below, enables us to measure separately the impact of short-run 
(structural and impulse) and long-run uncertainty. 
3
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 Note that Pagan (1984) criticizes this two-step procedure for its misspecifications due to the use of 
generated variables from the first stage as regressors in the second stage. According this line of 
reasoning, the simultaneous conditional mean and variance estimation as in a GARCH-in-mean 
(GARCH-M) model is more efficient than a two-step approach. However, as pointed out by Grier and 
Perry (1998) and Fountas et al (2004), Pagan’s approach has the drawback that it does not allow 
testing possible lagged effects of inflation uncertainty on inflation, which might exist at the monthly 
or quarterly frequency. Fountas et al (2004) report the estimation results of an EGARCH-M model, which 
confirm that a simultaneous approach does not detect the causal effect of inflation uncertainty on inflation. 
For these reasons, following Grier and Perry (1998) we also adopt the two-step procedure. 
3
 Other strands of the literature analyse the relationship between inflation and its uncertainty using 
long-memory models (see Conrad and Karanasos, 2006), and possible asymmetries (see Brunner and 
Hess, 1993): examples are the EGARCH model of Nelson (1991) used in Fountas et al, 2004); the 
Threshold GARCH (TGARCH) model of Zakoian (1994) and Glosten et al (1993), and the 
component GARCH (CGARCH) model of Engle and Lee (1993) (both these models are estimated by 
Grier and Perry, 1998, and Kontonikas, 2004).  
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3. Econometric Framework 
 All the methods discussed above have the drawback that they do not take into 
account the fact that uncertainty about the long- and short-term prospects for 
inflation might differ significantly and affect inflation expectations in different ways. 
As emphasised by Evans (1991), agents’ temporal decisions are more likely to be 
affected by the conditional variance of short-run movements in inflation, whilst 
intertemporal decisions might be based mainly on changes in the conditional 
variance of long-term inflation. Moreover, one should distinguish between 
“structural uncertainty” (associated with the randomness in the time-varying 
parameters, and representing the propagation mechanism), which might originate, for 
instance, from unanticipated monetary policy changes, and “impulse uncertainty” 
(associated with the shocks hitting the conditional variance, which are propagated 
through the parameters of the inflation process), reflecting, for example, changes in 
the variance of structural disturbances such as price shocks (see Berument et al, 
2005). Apart from Evans (1991), other studies that attempt to decompose US 
inflation uncertainty into its long-run and short-run components include Ball and 
Cecchetti (1990), Evans and Wachtel (1993), and Guler and Ozlale (2004).
 4
 
The econometric framework suggested by Evans (1991), and also adopted by 
Berument et al (2005) in their analysis of the linkages between UK inflation 
uncertainty and interest rates, has the advantage over alternative approaches of 
yielding estimates of the various types of uncertainty discussed above. Following 
Evans (1991), in the present study we utilise a GARCH model with time-varying 
parameters, which are estimated using Kalman filtering, for Euro-area inflation rates. 
More specifically, inflation is specified as a k-th order autoregressive process, AR(k), 
with time-varying parameters, the residuals of this equation following a 
GARCH(1,1) process. The model is the following: 
 
                                                          
4
 Evans and Wachtel (1993) stress that the assumption of fixed parameters in the inflation process 
overestimates the degree to which agents can forecast inflation, and consequently underestimates 
inflation uncertainty. They decompose the sources of inflation uncertainty into two components: 
“regime uncertainty component” and “certainty equivalence component”. The second component 
ignores uncertainty about future inflation regimes and reflects only the variance of future shocks to the 
inflation process. The first component reflects the agents’ uncertainty about the characteristics of the 
current policy regime or even future regimes, if there is a possibility that the regime will change.  
Thus, cross-counties differences in the conduct of monetary policy may account for the differences in 
the average levels of uncertainty. This decomposition allows inflation uncertainty to change over time 
as agents keep updating their information on the current regime and their expectations about the future 
regime.  See also the comment by Brunner (1993). 
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1 1t te   t t+1X β  where     1 (0, )t te N h    and   [1,  ,  ...,  ]t t k  tX   (1) 
2
1 1t t th h ae h             (2) 
 t+1 t t+1β β V  where     ( , )Nt+1V 0 Q      (3) 
 
where πt+1 denotes the rate of inflation between t and t+1; Xt is a vector of 
explanatory variables known at time t; et+1 describes the shocks to the inflation 
process that cannot be forecast with information known at time t; et+1 is assumed to 
be normally distributed with a time-varying conditional variance ht. The conditional 
variance is specified as a GARCH(p,q) process, that is, as a linear function of past 
squared forecast errors, e
2
t-i, and past variances, ht-j. Further, 
'
0, 1 1, 1 , 1[ , ,..., ]t t k t    t+1β  denotes the time-varying parameter vector 
5
, and Vt+1 is a 
vector of shocks to βt+1, assumed to be normally distributed with a homoscedastic 
covariance matrix Q. The updating equations for the Kalman filter are: 
 
1 1t t tE   t t+1X β          (4) 
'
t tH h t tt+1tX Ω X          (5) 
'
1 2 1 1 1[ ]t t t tE E H    t+ t+ tt+1tβ β Ω X        (6) 
'
12 1
[ ]tH    t tt+ t t+1t t+1tΩ I Ω X X Ω Q       (7) 
 
where 
t+1 t
Ω  is the conditional covariance matrix of t+1β  given the information set at 
time t, representing uncertainty about the structure of the inflation process.  
As Eq. (5) indicates, the conditional variance of inflation (short-run 
uncertainty), Ht, can be decomposed into: (i) the uncertainty due to randomness in 
the inflation shocks et+1, measured by their conditional volatility ht (impulse 
uncertainty); (ii) the uncertainty due to unanticipated changes in the structure of 
inflation Vt+1, measured by the conditional variance of t t+1X β , which is 
'
tSt tt+1 tX Ω X  (structural uncertainty). The standard GARCH model can be 
                                                          
5
 Evans (1991) provides a theoretical justification for the random walk specification of the time-
varying parameter vector. He argues (p. 176): “Suppose, for example, that all the structural variations 
in inflation reflect changes in monetary policy which in turn are due to changing views about the 
structure of the economy. Since it would be very hard to predict any future change in policy and hence 
movements in βt under these conditions, Etβt+1 = Etβt as implied by a random walk for βt.” 
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obtained as a special case of our model if there is no uncertainty about 
t+1β , so that 

t+1 t
Ω 0 . In this case, the conditional variance of inflation depends solely on 
impulse uncertainty
6
. Eqs. (6) and (7) capture the updating of the conditional 
distribution of 
t+1β over time in response to new information about realised inflation. 
As indicated by Eq. (6), inflation innovations, defined as εt+1  in Eq. (4), are used to 
update the estimates of 
t+1β . These estimates are then used to forecast future 
inflation.  
If there are no inflation shocks and parameter shocks, so that 
1 ...t t t k       for all t, we can calculate the steady-state rate of inflation, 
*
1t  , 
as: 
 
1
*
1 0. 1 . 11
1
k
t t i ti
  

  
  
          (8) 
 
The conditional variance of steady-state inflation is then given by: 
 
2 *
1( )t t t tE E     
'
t+1 t+1t+1t
β Ω β        (9) 
 
where   
 
 
 
1
. 11
2
0. 1 . 11
2
0. 1 . 11
1
1
...
1
k
t i ti
k
t t t i ti
t
k
t t t i ti
E
E E
E
E E

 
 



 

 
 

 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 



'
t+1β      is a (k+1 x 1) vector.           (10)
   
 Having computed short-run and steady-state uncertainty measures for each 
country, we then proceed, in the second part of our empirical investigation, to 
analyse the links between the various types of inflation uncertainty and the level of 
inflation, and to examine the impact of the Euro. Specifically, we regress the two 
uncertainty measures against past inflation
7
. Moreover, we include a dummy variable 
                                                          
6
 As Evans (1991) argues, if there is uncertainty about βt+1, ht will tend to understate the true 
conditional variance since St > 0.  
7
 In contrast to Evans (1991, p. 180) where “the regressions use the month-to-month changes in the 
variances and inflation because inflation has a unit root and all three variances are complicated 
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to allow for possible intercept and slope changes in the underlying relationship 
between inflation uncertainty and past inflation reflecting the introduction of the 
Euro. The estimated model is the following: 
 
1 0 1 1 2 3 1 1( )t t t t tunc D D                                   (11) 
 
where unct+1 represents in turn steady-state uncertainty (i.e. 
2 *
1( )t t   ) and short-run 
uncertainty (i.e., tH ), and Dt+1 is a dummy variable equal to zero during the pre-
Euro period and one during the Euro period. 
In the model specified above, the possible structural break in the relationship 
between inflation and inflation uncertainty in the Euro area is exogenously fixed at 
January 1999. However, the mere announcement of a regime switching from floating 
to fixed rates could have induced changes in the behaviour of rational agents and 
thereby could have affected the inflation-uncertainty relationship prior to the fixing 
in 1999 (see Wilfling, 2004, and Wilfling and Maennig, 2001) . Hence, we also apply 
the procedure developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) for multiple structural 
change models, which enables one to determine endogenously the number of breaks 
and the break dates. The procedure considers all possible models under the 
assumption of a given number of breaks and a given minimum distance between the 
break dates. The selected “optimal” model is then the one which minimises the sum 
of squared residuals and some information criteria. In our application we allow for 
up to three possible breaks, and use the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) to 
choose the best specification
8
. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Data 
Inflation is measured as the first difference of the logarithm of the seasonally 
adjusted consumer price index (CPI), 1 1100*(ln ln )t t tCPI CPI    , using monthly 
data for twelve EMU countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, 
Ireland, Finland, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Austria) over the period 1973-
                                                                                                                                                                    
functions of past inflation”, we utilise the levels of the series since inflation was found to be stationary 
when structural breaks were taken into account. 
8
 An alternative, sequential procedure is also discussed by Bai and Perron (2003). 
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2004. Six years of the Euro period are included in our sample
9
, allowing us to study 
the effects of the 1999 policy regime shift on inflation uncertainty over a reasonably 
long horizon. The data are obtained from OECD's Main Economic Indicators: 
Historical Statistics.  
 
 
4.2 Unit root tests results 
Establishing the order of integration of inflation is important for our 
subsequent empirical analysis. In columns 2-5 of Table 1 we report the results from 
ADF (see Dickey and Fuller, 1979, 1981) and KPSS (see Kwiatkowski, Phillips, 
Schmidt, and Shin, 1992) unit root tests with an intercept and a deterministic linear 
trend. Overall, the results suggest that inflation in our sample countries has a unit 
root. This is consistent with the findings of Rapach and Weber (2004), who also 
conclude that inflation is non-stationary using a sample of OECD countries and the 
Ng-Perron unit root test (see Ng and Perron, 2001).  
[Table 1 about here] 
A potential shortcoming of the ADF unit root test is that a stationary variable 
that is subject to structural breaks may appear to be non-stationary. Since Perron 
(1989), it has been recognised that ignoring an existing structural break results in a 
greater tendency to under-reject the null of unit root when the stationary alternative is 
true
10
. Perron’s (1989) initial approach was to allow for a single exogenously 
imposed structural break under both the null and alternative hypotheses. Subsequent 
studies have emphasized the need to determine the break endogenously from the data 
(see, e.g., Perron, 1997). Given the relatively long span of our inflation series, in 
order to account for the possibility of more than one structural break, we utilise the 
endogenous two-break unit root test of Lee and Strazicich (2003). This test 
counterbalances the potential loss of power of tests that overlook the possibility of 
more than one break. Unlike the Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) two-break unit root 
test,
11
 the Lee and Strazicich test includes breaks under both the null and the 
                                                          
9
 As Greece adopted the Euro only in January 2001, the corresponding sub-sample is four years. 
10
 Clark (2006) and Levin and Piger (2004) among others allow for the possibility of structural breaks 
when examining inflation persistence. For a recent survey on unit root tests and structural breaks see 
Perron (2006). Rapach and Wohar (2005) also test for breaks and find pervasive evidence of shifts in 
the level of inflation in a wide range of European countries. 
11
 The null hypothesis in the endogenous two-break unit root test of Lumsdaine and Papell (1997) 
assumes no structural breaks, while the alternative does not necessarily imply broken trend 
stationarity. Thus, rejecting the null may be interpreted as rejection of a unit root with no structural 
break, and not necessarily as rejection of a unit root per se. 
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alternative hypotheses, with rejections of the null unambiguously implying trend 
stationarity. Two models are considered, one that allows for two breaks in the level 
of inflation (Model A), and one that allows for two breaks in the intercept and the 
trend of inflation (Model C). 
In columns 6-11 of Table 1 we report the results from the Lee and Strazicich 
two-break unit root test. Allowing for two shifts in the intercept and the slope of 
inflation provides greater support for inflation stationarity, as compared to the model 
that allows only for level breaks, since unit root rejection rates increase from 8/12 to 
12/12 when we switch from Model A to Model C. Thus, inflation can be treated as a 
stationary variable in all sample countries when breaks in the intercept and the slope 
of the series are taken into account. This finding is very important since it allows us 
to further proceed and extract steady-state inflation and the corresponding 
uncertainty from the inflation series, something which could not be conceptualised if 
there was no mean reversion and the variance of inflation was explosive
12
. Regarding 
the dates of the breaks, Model C indicates that at least one of the breaks takes place 
around the mid and late-1970s, a period of high and volatile inflation. In general, 
breaks tend to occur prior to 1999 with only a few instances (Germany, France and 
Luxembourg) of a break around the introduction of the Euro, or during the post-Euro 
period.   
 
4.3 Time-varying GARCH model estimates 
 We have estimated a time-varying GARCH model for inflation with Kalman 
filtering, as described in section 3. Table 2 reports the preferred specifications. t-tests 
of significance applied to estimates of the main diagonal of Q indicate that overall 
there is time variation in the parameters of the model. In each country, at least one of 
the parameters’ variance estimates (i) is significantly different from zero. 
Statistically significant time-variation appears to be present either in the intercept of 
the inflation model (e.g. Ireland), or in some of the lags (e.g. France), or in both 
intercept and lags (e.g. Germany).  The ARCH () and GARCH () parameter 
estimates are positive and statistically significant in most cases. In a number of 
countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, and Finland) the sum of the ARCH 
and GARCH coefficients almost equals one, indicating that volatility shocks are very 
persistent. Ljung-Box test statistics of the squared standardised residuals at lags one 
                                                          
12
 We would like to thank a referee for raising this point. 
 12 
to six
13
 show that, with the exception of a few lags in a small minority of countries, 
there are no remaining GARCH effects at the 5% level of significance.  Hence, 
overall, Table 2 indicates that there is time-variation in the parameters of the 
inflation model and that the GARCH(1,1) conditional variance specification captures 
the dynamics of inflation volatility. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Figures 1-3 are based on the estimation results. Figure 1 plots actual inflation 
and steady-state inflation in the EMU countries over the period 1980.01-2004.11. In 
the early years of the new monetary regime the Euro area was affected by a variety 
of price shocks such as the tripling of oil prices between early 1999 and mid-2000, 
the depreciation of the common currency over this period, and finally, in 2001, 
significant increases in food prices, due to a series of livestock epidemics.  This is 
evident across the EMU countries in the plots of actual inflation. Average monthly 
inflation rates vary considerably in the EMU area, ranging from 0.2% in Germany to 
1% in Greece. Similarly to the former country, mean monthly inflation rates in the 
Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) and Austria were low: 
0.26%, 0.21%, 0.26% and 0.23%, respectively. Steady-state inflation follows similar 
patterns.  The Club-Med countries were the worst performers in terms of annualised 
steady-state inflation rate: Greece 12%, Portugal 9.8%, Spain 6.6%, Italy 6.4%, 
while the corresponding value for Germany, Austria and the Benelux countries was 
around 3%. Ireland, France, and Finland fall somewhere in the middle with 
annualised steady state inflation rates of 5.2%, 4.5%, and 4.2%, respectively.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Busetti et al (2006) also present evidence of diverging behaviour in the 
inflation rate of the EMU countries since 1999. Such inflation differentials are often 
found even within monetary unions, where many economic differences may survive. 
The ECB itself admits that “monetary policy can only influence the price level of the 
Euro area as a whole and cannot affect inflation differentials across regions” (see The 
Monetary Policy of the ECB, 2004). Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of monetary 
policy effectiveness in stimulating economic growth, inflation rates in EMU 
countries should converge in order for changes in the Euro-wide nominal interest rate 
to be translated into similar real interest rate changes across member countries.  
                                                          
13
 The performance of the Ljung-Box test is affected by the number of lags (k) that are utilised. Tsay 
(2002) suggests that the choice of k = ln(sample size) provides better power performance. Thereby, we 
set an upper limit for k equal to ln(sample size)  6.  
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[Figure 2 about here] 
Figure 2 plots short-run uncertainty and steady-state uncertainty
14
. The 
former appears to have decreased over time in Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, 
Finland and Belgium. In Germany a large temporary increase in short-run 
uncertainty can be noticed around the time of the re-unification in the early 1990s. 
Short-run uncertainty in the Netherlands and Austria is relatively stable, apart from 
occasional temporary shocks. The same applies to Luxembourg, with the exception 
of a large temporary jump in 1999. From a policy point of view, it should be pointed 
out that some short-term volatility in inflation is inevitable given the fact that 
monetary policy can only affect prices with long and uncertain lags - hence the focus 
of the ECB on medium-term price stabilisation. Regarding the uncertainty associated 
with long-run inflation, it appears again that a uniform experience did not occur. 
Steady state uncertainty seems to increase over time (especially towards the end of 
the sample period) in Germany, Italy, Spain, Netherlands and Austria, while in 
France, Greece and Belgium it decreases over time. In Ireland and Finland a negative 
trend in steady state uncertainty throughout most of the sample period is replaced by 
a positive trend towards the end of the sample. Clearly, the presence of such 
significant differentials across the countries of the Euro area in terms of long-run (as 
opposed to short-run) uncertainty has important policy implications, given the focus 
of the ECB on maintaining price stability in the Euro area over longer periods of 
time.  
[Figure 3 about here] 
 Figure 3 plots inflation persistence (the sum of the estimated autoregressive 
coefficients in the inflation specification) and the trend component of inflation (the 
estimated constant in the inflation process). The former increases over time in 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Netherlands and Austria. Sharp increases in inflation 
persistence during the Euro era can be observed in Germany, Finland and 
Luxembourg. These results are in line with previous work by Angeloni et al (2005) 
finding that inflation persistence in the Euro area did not decline after the 
introduction of the Euro. Batini (2002) also shows that inflation in the Euro area is 
inertial using the autocorrelation function of inflation and the lag in the inflation 
response to monetary policy shocks from VAR’s to measure inflation persistence. 
                                                          
14
 Tests for the equality of mean and variance between short-run and steady-state uncertainty indicate 
that there are statistically significant differences between the two series in our sample countries. 
Results are not included to save space, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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Our results show that in some cases inflation persistence becomes negative. This can 
be interpreted in terms of an error-correction mechanism in inflation: as inflation 
grows large, the central bank adopts tougher anti-inflationary policies. Trend 
inflation decreases over time in the majority of the sample countries, reflecting the 
general move towards lower inflation after the highly inflationary 1970s.  
 
4.4 Estimates of the inflation-uncertainty relationship 
 Table 3 reports robust estimates of the parameters of Eq. (11) (see Newey and 
West, 1994).  Consistently with the hypothesis put forward by Friedman (1977) and 
formalised by Ball (1992), the coefficient of past inflation, 2, is positive and 
significant in seven out of our twelve sample countries in the steady-state uncertainty 
regressions, i.e. in the case of Germany, France, Greece, Ireland, Finland, Belgium 
and Luxembourg. In contrast to the Friedman-Ball hypothesis and in line with the 
arguments put forth by Pourgerami and Maskus (1987) and Ungar and Zilberfarb 
(1993) the relationship is negative and significant in Spain, Netherlands and Austria. 
When short-run uncertainty is employed as a dependent variable, 2 is significantly 
positive in nine instances, i.e. in Germany, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, 
Finland, Belgium and Luxembourg
15
. This suggests that, monetary authorities can 
reduce the negative consequences of inflation uncertainty by lowering average 
inflation. Our results for the Euro-area establish a link between inflation and both 
short-run and long-run uncertainty in most countries, and therefore differ from those 
of Evans (1991) and Ball and Cecchetti (1990) for the US, as these authors 
documented a strong link between inflation and long-term uncertainty but reported 
little evidence of a link between inflation and short-term uncertainty. 
[Table 3 about here] 
As for the impact of the Euro and common monetary policy on the level of 
inflation uncertainty, we find that the coefficient of the intercept dummy, 1, is 
positive and statistically significant in eight out of twelve cases in the steady-state 
regressions, indicating that steady-state uncertainty has increased in the Euro period 
in these countries (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Finland, Luxembourg and 
Austria). Steady-state uncertainty decreased only in Portugal and Belgium. There are 
50% less cases of statistically significant intercept dummy when short-run 
                                                          
15
 This is in line with previous evidence for the UK (see Kontonikas, 2004). 
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uncertainty is considered, since only in 4/12 cases 1 is positive and significant 
(Germany, Italy, Ireland and Luxembourg) and in 1/12 cases negative and significant 
(Netherlands). Hence, it appears that it was steady-steady, rather than short-run, 
uncertainty that largely shifted after 1999. 
The coefficient of the slope dummy, 3, is negative and statistically 
significant in six countries (France, Greece, Ireland, Finland, Belgium and 
Luxembourg) in the steady-state regressions and in nine countries (Germany, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, Finland, Belgium and Luxembourg) in the short-run 
regressions. This indicates an important change in the underlying relationship 
between inflation and uncertainty occurring in these countries as a result of the 
introduction of the Euro, since a negative and significant 3 implies that in the Euro 
period further reductions in average inflation tend to increase, rather than reduce, 
uncertainty. The Wald F-statistic for the null hypothesis: 2 +3 = 0, indicates that 
after the introduction of the Euro the relationship between past inflation and current 
short-run uncertainty breaks down since the null hypothesis is not rejected in 8/12 
cases,  while remaining overall positive only in  3/12 steady-state uncertainty 
regressions. Thus, the Friedman-Ball link that calls for policies aiming at low 
inflation in order to reduce the corresponding uncertainty appears to have weakened 
considerably during the Euro period. 
Finally, we allow for the possible structural breaks in the relationship 
between inflation and inflation uncertainty to be determined endogenously using the 
Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) procedure outlined in the previous section.  The 
estimated break dates are reported in Table 4(a) and 4(b) for short-run and steady-
state uncertainty respectively
16
. As can be seen, for most countries two or three 
breaks are found. Concerning the dates of the breaks, a break in relationship between 
inflation and short-run uncertainty appears to occur around 1985-86 in all countries 
apart from Germany and Spain. The most important policy event taking place in the 
then called European Community around the time of the break detected in most 
countries was the adoption by the Committee of Central Bank Governors of some 
changes in the operation of the EMS and in the rules governing the activities of the 
European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF)
17
. These rules entered into force on 1 
                                                          
16
 The corresponding estimated coefficients for the implied subperiods are not included to save space, 
but are available from the authors upon request. 
17
 In particular, there were improvements in certain aspects of the use of the ECU by the central 
banks: more representative ECU interest rate, change in ECU holdings against foreign currencies, 
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July 1985
18
. In seven cases (Germany, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Netherlands, 
Luxembourg and Austria) a break is estimated in the period 1991-93, that is, during 
the first stage of the progress towards EMU
19
. Finally, in two cases (Spain, and 
Luxembourg) a break is estimated around 1999, the year when the third, and final, 
stage of EMU started with the adoption of a common currency and monetary policy. 
In the case of the relationship between inflation and steady-state uncertainty, seven 
countries exhibit a break around 1985-86 (France, Greece, Ireland, Finland, Belgium, 
Netherlands and Luxembourg), eight countries during the first stage of EMU 
(Germany, France, Portugal, Ireland, Finland, Belgium, Netherlands and Austria), 
and eight countries in 1999 (Germany, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Finland, Netherlands and 
Luxembourg). 
[Tables 4a, 4b about here] 
In general, it is clear that breaks in the relationship between the different 
types of inflation uncertainty and inflation itself occurred in many cases well before 
the introduction of the Euro and a common monetary policy on 1 January 1999, 
consistently with the theoretical literature that the mere announcement of a regime 
switching from floating to fixed rates at a given future date determines changes in the 
behaviour of rational agents prior to the fixing (see, e.g. Wilfling and Maennig, 2001, 
and Wilfling, 2004). The majority of the pre-Euro breaks in the inflation-uncertainty 
relationship occur around 1985 (when some changes in rules of the EMS occurred), 
and during the first stage of the progress towards EMU. 
 
5. Conclusions  
In this paper, we have investigated empirically the relationship between 
inflation and inflation uncertainty in twelve EMU countries. Following Evans (1991) 
and Berument et al (2005), we have adopted a time-varying GARCH specification to 
                                                                                                                                                                    
ECU for "other holders", 100% acceptability of the ECU for a creditor central bank with holdings 
lower than the volume allocated.  
18
 For a chronology of relevant policy events, see “EMU: A Historical Documentation”, 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/legalaspects/part_c_1.htm 
19
 In June 1989 the European Council decided that the first stage towards European Monetary Union 
(EMU) would begin in July 1990. The Treaty of Maastricht was agreed by the heads of state of the 
European Union (EU) in December 1991 setting out the framework for stages two and three of 
progress towards EMU. In the first stage, the members of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
abolished all remaining capital controls. Also, there was an increase in the degree of co-operation 
among the EMS central banks, while exchange rate realignments remained possible. The second stage 
started on 1/1/1994. During that stage, the European Monetary Institute, the precursor of the European 
Central Bank, was created. In order to participate to the third stage, which started on 1/1/1999 (apart 
from Greece where it started on 1/1/2001) countries had to satisfy five convergence criteria. 
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model the conditional volatility of inflation in order to be able to distinguish between 
short-run (structural and impulse) and steady-state uncertainty. We have also 
analysed the impact on the links between inflation and inflation uncertainty of the 
policy regime shift which occurred in 1999, when the Euro was introduced and the 
ECB was given the task of setting a common monetary policy for all EMU countries. 
First, we have imposed exogenously a break date corresponding to the actual 
introduction of the Euro on 1 January 1999; second, we have allowed for the 
possibility of an earlier adjustment in the behaviour of rational agents knowing in 
advance (and with certainty) that such a regime change would take place (see 
Wilfling, 2004 and Wilfling and Maennig, 2001), and have therefore used a 
procedure for determining endogenously the timing of the breaks (see Bai and 
Perron, 1996, 2003). 
Our empirical findings can be summarised as follows. The inflation 
performance of the EMU member states has been very different over the whole 
period starting at the beginning of the 1980s, in terms of both actual and steady-state 
inflation. Similarly, no consistent pattern can be found for the degree of persistence 
of inflation. By contrast, as one would expect given the less inflationary environment 
prevailing after the inflation hike of the 1970s, trend inflation has generally become 
much lower. Concerning short-run and steady-state uncertainty, again the EMU 
countries appear to have had rather different experiences, with no clear picture 
emerging. There is clear evidence that the Euro has had a significant impact on the 
relationship between inflation uncertainty and inflation, and that this has happened 
well before the 1
st
 of January 1999, as agents already knew that this regime change 
would take place. Moreover, the Friedman-Ball link between inflation and inflation 
uncertainty appears to have become weaker and even to have broken down in a 
number of countries. Clearly, the new environment poses a huge challenge to the 
ECB: remaining inflation differentials mean that a common monetary policy will 
have asymmetric effects across member countries, as real interest rates will not be 
equalized. Although heterogeneity in short-run uncertainty is not surprising given the 
typical lags of monetary policy, differences in steady-state uncertainty are 
undoubtedly a major concern in view of the goal of long-term price stability. 
Moreover, a less effective monetary policy after 1999, as implied by a weaker 
Friedman-Ball link, makes the task of the ECB even more difficult. 
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Overall, in view of our findings, one could conclude that the ECB up to now 
has performed rather well in keeping inflation under control, and agree broadly with 
Mr Trichet’s assessment. However, one might ask, could the ECB become even more 
successful? In particular, it could be argued that conflicting monetary signals, 
specifically some lack of transparency in the two-pillar strategy employed by the 
ECB, could be the reason why in the new economic environment monetary policy 
appears to have become less effective in lowering inflation uncertainty. As Bofinger 
(2002, p.11) argues, “In sum, while the first pillar is too narrowly focused on the 
money stock M3…the second pillar is much too broad to provide any guidance for 
the ECB’s internal decisions or its dialogue with public”. Rudebusch and Svensson 
(1999) also point out that emphasis on using movements in the stock of money as a 
rationale for policy is undesirable since it may result in higher inflation and output 
variability. Hence, it appears that improvements could be made to the ECB’s 
analytical framework with a view to lowering long-run uncertainty in individual 
member countries - for instance, a more explicit focus on the inflation forecast might 
be useful in this respect. 
 19 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Unit root tests, 1972-2004 
 
Country 
 
ADF  KPSS Lee and Strazicich 
Constant 
Constant 
and trend 
Constant 
Constant 
and trend 
Model A - Breaks in constant Model C- Breaks in constant and trend 
~ -stat Break dates ~ -stat Break dates 
Germany
 
-2.319 -2.605 2.235 *** 0.244 *** -4.06 ** 1990.10 1991.09 -8.52 *** 1991.09 2000.12 
Italy
 
-1.144 -3.375 * 1.999 *** 0.273 *** -5.92 *** 1984.01 1984.06 -7.62 *** 1975.12 1984.03 
France
 
-1.461 -2.896 1.646 *** 0.385 *** -3.91 ** 1983.04 1988.08 -6.6 *** 1983.06 1999.12 
Spain -1.006 -2.751 3.222 *** 0.451 *** -2.76 1975.05 1976.04 -10.96*** 1976.04 1977.01 
Portugal -1.579 -3.568 ** 2.634 *** 0.277 *** -5.66 *** 1976.07 1976.11 -11.84*** 1976.03 1977.01 
Greece -2.006 -2.704 1.845 *** 0.34 *** -6.15 *** 1978.09 1993.11 -10.3 *** 1975.08 1979.01 
Ireland
 
-1.595 -2.539 2.232 *** 0.262 *** -3.25 1975.04 1975.12 -11.3 *** 1980.03 1981.10 
Finland
 
-1.181 -3.132 2.037 *** 0.222 *** -4.67 *** 1976.11 1983.03 -8.44 *** 1975.12 1982.05 
Belgium
 
-1.929 -2.765 2.121 *** 0.265 *** -6.13 *** 1975.09 1976.09 -8.5 *** 1976.01 1985.05 
Netherlands -1.787 -1.965 2.578 *** 0.864 *** -3.32 1977.04 1978.06 -9.19 *** 1976.03 1991.07 
Luxembourg -2.438 -2.523 3.195 *** 0.304 *** -5.01 *** 1979.08 1984.10 -8.85 *** 1998.12 2001.01 
Austria
 
-2.369 -2.684 3.282 *** 0.301 *** -3.16 1984.01 1984.07 -8.27 *** 1976.07 1984.01 
 
Note: The number of lagged difference terms in the regressions was chosen by the modified Akaike criterion in the ADF test. The Andrews bandwidth was used in the KPSS test. In 
the Lee-Strazicich test, the number of lagged difference terms was chosen by the ‘t-sig’ approach suggested by Perron (1997).  We set an upper bound of twelve for the lag length 
and test down until a significant (at the 10% level) lag is found. The reported ADF and Lee and Strazicich statistics test the null hypothesis that inflation contains a unit root. The 
reported KPSS statistics test the null hypothesis that inflation is stationary. ***, **, * indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5, 10% level of significance. 
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Table 2: Kalman filter estimates, 1972-2004 
Country AR specification and coefficient variance estimates 
GARCH estimates Squared Standarized  Residuals Diagnostics 
h   LB(1) LB(2) LB(3) LB(4) LB(5) LB(6) 
Germany
 1 0, 1 1, 1 11 1
0 1=0.025***  =0.019**  
t t t t te   
 
        0.017 *** 0.244 ** 0.464 *** 
0.117 
[0.732] 
0.595 
[0.743] 
3.041 
0.385] 
3.041 
[0.551] 
3.863 
[0.569] 
4.23 
[0.646] 
Italy
 1 0, 1 1, 1 2, 1 2 2, 1 6 2, 1 11 1
0 1 2 3 4=0.03***  =0.005  =0.016  =0.002  =0.024***
t t t t t t t t t t te         
    
                0.0001 0.105 *** 0.8947 *** 
1.585 
[0.208] 
1.92 
[0.338] 
8.782 
[0.032] 
8.827 
[0.065] 
9.972 
[0.076] 
10.652 
[0.099] 
France
 1 0, 1 1, 1 2, 1 7 1
0 1 2=0.007  =0.049*  =0.051 
t t t t t t te     
  
          0.247 0.356 0.299 *** 
0.038 
[0.846] 
2.817 
[0.245] 
3.047 
[0.385] 
3.055 
[0.549] 
3.131 
[0.68] 
5.978 
[0.426] 
Spain 
1 0, 1 1, 1 2, 1 2 2, 1 7 2, 1 11 1
0 1 2 3 4=0.023***  =0.00  =0.021**  =0.008  =0.018***
t t t t t t t t t t te         
    
                0.001 0.108 *** 0.891 *** 
0.186 
[0.666] 
2.213 
[0.331] 
2.316 
[0.51] 
3.796 
[0.434] 
11.798 
[0.038] 
12.338 
[0.055] 
Portugal 
1 0, 1 1, 1 2, 1 2 1
0 1 2=0.039***  =0.031***  =0.038*** 
t t t t t t te     
  
          0.006 * 0.121 *** 0.863 *** 
3.518 
[0.061] 
3.862 
[0.145] 
4.358 
[0.225] 
6.394 
[0.172] 
10.18 
[0.07] 
13.418 
[0.037] 
Greece 
1 0, 1 1, 1 1 2, 1 2 2, 1 6 2, 1 7 1
0 1 2 3 4=0.038***  =0.033***  =0.00  =0.005  =0.00
t t t t t t t t t t te         
    
                 0.001 0.062 *** 0.9378*** 
0.636 
[0.425] 
5.624 
[0.06] 
6.327 
[0.097] 
7.033 
[0.134] 
8.688 
[0.122] 
11.096 
[0.086] 
Ireland
 1 0, 1 1, 1 2, 1 3 1
0 1 2=0.087***  =0.019  =0.018 
t t t t t t te     
  
          0.307 *** 0.989 *** 0.000 
1.606 
[0.205] 
1.920 
[0.383] 
2.216 
[0.529] 
2.880 
[0.578] 
3.322 
[0.651] 
12.036 
[0.061] 
Finland
 1 0, 1 1, 1 5 2, 1 8 1
0 1 2=0.021***  =0.022*  =0.025* 
t t t t t t te     
  
           0.001 *** 0.0625 ** 0.9366 *** 
0.078 
[0.78] 
0.522 
[0.77] 
0.953 
[0.813] 
0.966 
[0.915] 
6.292 
[0.279] 
9.898 
[0.129] 
Belgium
 1 0, 1 1, 1 2, 1 3 2, 1 5 2, 1 14 1
0 1 2 3 4=0.008  =0.012  =0.021**  =0.002  =0.014
t t t t t t t t t t te         
    
                0.004 0.079 ** 0.874 *** 
1.232 
[0.267] 
5.010 
[0.082] 
6.667 
[0.083] 
8.311 
[0.081] 
8.312 
[0.14] 
9.905 
[0.129] 
Netherlands 
1 0, 1 1, 1 3 2, 1 11 1
0 1 2=0.022***  =0.00  =0.012 
t t t t t t te     
  
           0.011 ** 0.169 ** 0.666 *** 
0.823 
[0.364] 
1.458 
[0.483] 
2.448 
[0.485] 
3.836 
[0.429] 
4.134 
[0.53] 
15.056 
[0.02] 
Luxembourg 
1 0, 1 1, 1 2, 1 4 2, 1 5 2, 1 10 1
0 1 2 3 4=0.025**  =0.011  =0.00  =0.031**  =0.00
t t t t t t t t t t te         
    
                0.014 ** 0.081 ** 0.751 *** 
0.147 
[0.701] 
0.274 
[0.872] 
0.354 
[0.95] 
0.413 
[0.981] 
0.422 
[0.995] 
1.026 
[0.985] 
Austria
 1 0, 1 1, 1 5 2, 1 11 1
0 1 2=0.019***  =0.015  =0.044 
t t t t t t te     
  
           0.012 ** 0.066 0.774 *** 
0.183 
[0.669] 
0.692 
[0.708] 
0.697 
[0.874] 
0.859 
[0.93] 
1.036 
[0.96] 
2.74 
[0.841] 
 
Note: The reported i’s are estimates of the parameters’ variance (main diagonal elements of the Q matrix). LB(k) indicates the Ljung-Box  test statistic for  squared standarized 
residuals’ ˆ( / )t te h  serial correlation at lag k, and the figures in square brackets underneath represent the associated p-values. ***, **, * indicate the 1, 5, 10% level of significance. 
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Table 3: Robust estimates of Eq. (11), 1980-2004 
 
 
Parameter 
Germany France Italy Spain  
Steady-state 
Uncertainty 
Short-run 
Uncertainty 
Steady-state 
uncertainty 
Short-run 
uncertainty 
Steady-state 
uncertainty 
Short-run 
uncertainty 
Steady-state 
uncertainty 
Short-run 
uncertainty 
0  0.104 *** 0.107 *** 0.016  0.94 *** 0.224 *** 0.036 *** 0.258 *** 0.23 *** 
1  0.115 *** 0.027 * 0.021 * 0.011 0.742 *** 0.07 *** 0.407 *** -0.035 
2  0.039 *** 0.127 *** 0.28 *** 0.023 -0.013  0.268 *** -0.117 *** 0.175 *** 
3  -0.009 -0.135 ** -0.273 *** -0.01 -0.51 -0.265 *** -0.128 -0.179 *** 
2R  0.51 0.22 0.66 0.02 0.63 0.495 0.52 0.27 
  0.047 0.056 0.069 0.07 0.213 0.118 0.201 0.157 
Wald F-stat 
γ 2+ γ3 = 0 
- 0.238 0.046 - - 0.235 - 0.099 
 
 
 
Parameter 
Portugal Greece Ireland Finland 
Steady-state 
Uncertainty 
Short-run 
Uncertainty 
Steady-state 
Uncertainty 
Short-run 
uncertainty 
Steady-state 
Uncertainty 
Short-run 
uncertainty 
Steady-state 
uncertainty 
Short-run 
uncertainty 
0  0.537 *** 0.545 *** 0.232 *** 0.644 *** 0.145 *** 0.498 *** 0.071 *** 0.236 *** 
1  -0.171 *** -0.051 -0.16 -0.031 0.015 *** 2.099 *** 0.034 *** -0.023 
2  -0.009 0.376 *** 0.303 *** 0.352 *** 0.006 *** 2.667 *** 0.115 *** 0.256 *** 
3  0.011 -0.389 *** -0.301 *** -0.336 *** -0.005 *** -4.056 *** -0.136 *** -0.266 *** 
2R  0.19 0.32 0.53 0.23 0.363 0.45 0.33 0.38  
  0.141 0.476 0.282 0.582 0.01 2.434 0.06 0.134 
Wald F-stat 
γ 2+ γ3 = 0 
- 0.243 8.942 *** 1.281 12.624 *** 46.5 *** 1.483  1.253 
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Parameter 
Belgium  Netherlands Luxembourg Austria  
Steady-state 
Uncertainty 
Short-run 
Uncertainty 
Steady-state 
Uncertainty 
Short-run 
uncertainty 
Steady-state 
Uncertainty 
Short-run 
Uncertainty 
Steady-state 
Uncertainty 
Short-run 
uncertainty 
0  0.048 *** 0.148 *** 0.132 *** 0.14 *** 0.036 *** 0.16 *** 0.166 *** 0.171 *** 
1  -0.033 *** -0.005 -0.013  -0.028 *** 0.04 *** 0.05 *** 0.088 * -0.004 
2  0.061 *** 0.079 *** -0.077 *** -0.025 0.087 *** 0.0831 *** -0.079 * 0.019 
3  -0.06 *** -0.072 * 0.013 0.096 * -0.0874 *** -0.0835 ** 0.045 0.006 
2R  0.50 0.21 0.21 0.07 0.15 0.12 0.07 0.04 
  0.028 0.049 0.044 0.041 0.06 0.073 0.18 0.032 
Wald F-stat 
γ 2+ γ3 = 0 
1.545  0.11 - - 0.0001 0.0001 - - 
 
Note:    represents the standard deviation of the regression’s residuals. ***, **, * indicate the 1, 5, 10 % level of significance.
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Table 4(a): Bai-Perron endogenous break test, short-run uncertainty, 1980-2004 
 
Countries 
  Number of 
       breaks 
         Break dates BIC 
Germany          2 1991.07, 1996.11 -5.891 
France 
 
         1 1985.07 -5.258 
Italy          1 1984.12 -4.448 
Spain          3 1988.09, 1993.09, 1999.11 -4.825 
Portugal          2 1986.03, 1991.03 -2.723 
Greece          2 1984.12, 1995.04 -1.986 
Ireland          2 1984.12, 1997.01 0.77 
Finland          2 1984.12, 1991.11 -5.404 
Belgium          1 1984.12 -6.691 
Netherlands          2 1986.02, 1991.02 -6.463 
Luxembourg          3 1986.05 , 1993.08 , 1999.02 -5.466 
Austria          3 1985.01, 1992.09, 1997.09 -6.997 
 
Note: BIC denotes the Bayesian Information Criterion. The following specification is assumed  
in the Bai-Perron test:  
1 0 1 1t t tH         
 
 
Table 4(b): Bai-Perron endogenous break test, steady-state uncertainty, 1980-2004 
 
Countries 
  Number of 
       breaks 
        Break dates BIC 
Germany          2 1990.11, 1999.11 -6.172 
France          2 1984.12, 1991.01 -5.645 
Italy          2 1994.11 ,  1999.11 -3.166 
Spain          3 1989.11, 1994.11, 1999.11 -3.382 
Portugal          2 1990.02, 1997.05 -4.491 
Greece          2 1984.12, 1994.02 -3.069 
Ireland          3 1984.12, 1990.05, 1999.09 -10.213 
Finland          3 1984.12, 1992.09, 1999.11 -5.925 
Belgium          3 1984.12, 1991.01, 1996.01 -7.919 
Netherlands          3 1986.07, 1991.08, 1999.11 -6.613 
Luxembourg          2 1984.12 , 1999.11 -5.368 
Austria          2 1992.07, 1997.07 -4.445 
 
 
Note: BIC denotes the Bayesian Information Criterion. The following specification is assumed  
in the Bai-Perron test:  2 *
1 0 1 1( )t t t t          
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Figure 1: Actual inflation and steady-state inflation, 1980-2004.  
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Figure 2: Short-run and steady-state inflation uncertainty, 1980-2004.  
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Figure 3: Inflation persistence and trend inflation, 1980-2004.  
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